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vided that no consolidation into one corporation might be approved by the
Commission unless in harmony with a plan for the consolidation of all
railways into a limited number of systems, which the Commission was
directed to prepare.11 0 Since the Commission's plan was not completed until
1929,111 no consolidations could be approved prior to that date, but con-
solidations were permitted to go on under state law without Commission
approval, thus countenancing the creation of multiple corporations. 11 2 Al-
though the amendment of 1933 provided that all unifications of control of
two or more railways undertaken without Commission approval are illegal,11 3
approval of a statutory consolidation of corporations of two states, even if
it supplies a lack of corporate power, would be of little assistance today
where the states provide no machinery to achieve consolidation, since it is
clear that federal incorporation is not intended. Furthermore, where the
state machinery provided does not permit the consolidated corporation to
choose the state in which it will incorporate, Commission approval of a
unification accomplished in this manner could hardly prevent a multiple
corporation from arising; for there would seem to be no reason why Com-
mission approval should effect the doctrine that a multiple corporation arises
when the consolidation statutes of two states are used to unite.
ORGANIZED BASEBALL AND THE LAW*
EARLY in the history of professional baseball, the club owners began to
cooperate for mutual benefit.' One result of this cooperation is the uniform
players' contract, containing a "reserve clause" by which a player signing
for one season gives the club an option on his services for the following
season at a salary subsequently to be determined by the parties. Since the
110. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), as amended, 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2,4)
(1934).
111. Consolidation of Railroads, 159 I. C. C. 522 (1929), modified, 163 I. C. C. 188
(1929), 185 I. C. C. 403 (1932).
112. Snyder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 118 Ohio St. 72, 160 N. E. 615 (1928),
aff'd, 278 U. S. 578 (1929) ; Acquisition of Lines & Stock Issue by Penn., 0. & D. R. R.,
105 I. C. C. 189 (1925) ; see Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Devel-
opmnents of the Last Decade (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 29, 32 et seq.
113. 48 STAT. 218 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (6) (1934).
*The YALE LAV JOURNAL gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Charles H.
Schnee and Sidney M. Schreiber in the research connected with this Comment.
1. In 1876 the National League was formed, taking control of baseball from the
players and putting it in the hands of entrepreneurs. In 1882 the first National Agree-
ment was formulated. SPiNK, THE NATIONAL GAME (1910) 14. The present National
Agreement was adopted by the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues
in 1901. HEILBRONER, BASEBALL BLUEBOOK (1937) 148.
[Vol. 46: 13861386
ORGANIZED BASEBALL AND THE LAW 1
contract entered into in each succeeding season will have a similar provision,
the player is really signing for the duration of his baseball life. The club
is also given power to release the player on ten days' notice or to assign his
contract to some other club.2 While courts have frequently declined to enforce
such contracts for the clubs,3 close organization among club owners has now
relieved them of the necessity of resorting to the courts. The "National
Agreement," subscribed to by every owner in organized baseball and admin-
istered by a commission of their choosing, provides that a player's violation
of his contract renders him ineligible,4 and subjects to severe penalties any
club that hires an ineligible player. Since the organization of owners is
so widespread as to control the entire available supply of skilled players,
blacklisting a man ends his baseball career.
Baseball's employer-employee situation is sid gencris. A player can sell
his services to the club making the best offer only when he is a free agent
-a status which he will have either when he is just breaking into baseball
or when the club holding his contract has no further use for his services
and is unable to trade or sell him to some other club. In neither of these
situations is his bargaining power likely to be great.6 At any other time,
the player must accept the terms of the owner claiming his services or
2. The system of sending players from one club to another has been likened to
slave trading [Sanborn, The White Slaves of the Diamond, EvMVEDoD's AGAzn,
October, 1913, p. 524] and horse trading [Fullerton, Baseball-The Business and the
Sport, Rvmv OF REviwmvs, April, 1921, p. 417, 413].
Minneapolis of the American Association once traded a player for a bull-dog
[N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1915, p. 10, col. 3]; the St. Louis Cardinals traded a pitcher
for a bird-dog [Ibid.]; and Omaha of the Western League sw.'apped a pitcher and a
catcher for an airplane. N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1924, p. 17, col. 2.
3. Weeghman v. Killifer, 215 Fed. 2S9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914), aff'9 215 Fed. 163
(IV. D. Mich. 1914); Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 Fed. 782 (E. D. Pa.
1902); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. 198 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 190);
Allegheny Base-Ball Club v. Bennett, 14 Fed. 257 (C. C. IV. D. Pa. 182); Cincinnati
Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914); Baltimore Base Ball & Exhibition
Co. v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, 28 Atl. 279 (1894) ; American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibi-
tion Co. v. Harper, 54 CENr. L. J. 449 (C. C. St. Louis 1902); American League Club
of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914) ; Metropolitan
Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. C. 393, 9 N. Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1390) ; Colum-
bus Baseball Club v. Reiley, 11 Ohio Dec. Repr. 272 (1891) ; Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd.
v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. C. 57 (1890); Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa.
C. C. 337 (1890). Contra: Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 Fed. 269 (E. D.
Mo. 1914); American Ass'n Club of Kansas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. C. 232 (1890);
Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Ad. 973 (1902).
4. NATIONAL AGREEMENT, Art. 30, § 1.
5. Id., Art. 30, § 7.
6. Unless the player who is seeking his first contract has had college experience, he
must first sign with a minor league club. MAJoR-MNZCR LrAGuE Ru.Es, Rule 3 (f).
This operates indirectly to reduce his bargaining power, for the minor leagues are sub-
ject to salary limits. NATIONAL AaaxsuNTr, Art. 16, § 1.
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retire from the game.7 During the salary negotiations prior to the start of
the season, the club is usually in the dominating position, and only if the
player possesses such outstanding ability that the club would find it difficult
to replace him, will he be able to force a satisfactory compromise. Other-
wise he must rely solely upon the owner's reluctance to sacrifice the invest-
ment represented by the athlete's original cost and present transfer value.
In any event, the player can not take advantage of the fact that there might
be more generous club owners willing to make him a better offer. If his
club is one of the less wealthy and less successful, he may go through his
entire career without acquiring either the fame or the remuneration merited
by his ability- and without ever sharing a world series plum.8 If he is
traded, he must work for his new team even though it be in the hottest
part of Texas. If he is with a good club which has a slightly better man
at his position, but nevertheless can afford to retain him, he may warm the
bench during the years when he should be developing - a misfortune which
has ruined some potentially great players.9 In return for the player's placing
his baseball fortune in the club's hands, the club promises only that it will
pay him a stipulated salary for so much of the current season as it desires
his services; on ten days' notice it can release him unconditionally and
terminate its obligation to pay him a salary.
The legality of this arrangement is questionable. Some courts have called
"organized baseball" a monopoly.' 0 The uniform contract has been assailed
as against public policy and in restraint of trade." and as too indefinite
12
7. N. Y. Times, April 3, 1936, p. 29, col. 1: "Babe Herman was told by the
Reds to sign his 1936 contract or quit baseball. General Manager Larry McPhail of
the Reds said 'Herman will play with the Reds in 1936 or he won't play.'"
N. Y. Times, April 5, 1936, § 5, p. 8, col. 4: "Herman signs."
8. See Westbrook Pegler's syndicated article, New Haven Register, April 8,
1937, p. 3, col. 1.
9. Outstanding examples: Ben Paschal, Sam Byrd (understudies to Babe Ruth).
10. See American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 CENT. L. J.
449, 450 (C. C. St. Louis 1902) ; American League Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc.
441, 461, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6, 17 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
Rep. Ray Cannon (D., Wis.) recently requested the Department of Justice to inves-
tigate organized baseball's alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The
Attorney General refused, citing Federal League Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Na-
tional League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922), which held that the clubs were not engaged in
interstate commerce. N. Y. Times, April 15, 1937, p. 25, col. 2. Federal investigation
and regulation have been suggested in the past by Rep. Gallagher (N. Y. Times, Jan.
6, 1914, p. 14, col. 3), by Rep. Bloom (N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1924, p. 17, col. 2), by Ban
Johnson (N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1925, p. 17, col. 1), by Rep. Kelly and Sen. Capper
(N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1927, p. 16, col. 1). No effective action has yet been taken.
Although it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would reverse its holding in the
Federal League case, supra, prosecutions could probably be brought under the state
anti-trust statutes.
11. See Allegheny Base-Ball Club. v. Bennett, American Base Ball & Aihletic Ex-
hibition Co. v. Harper, American League Club of Chicago v. Chase, all suspra note 3.
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or too one-sided 13 to be enforced in equity. The National Agreement's
provisions on ineligibility and trading are in apparent conflict with the anti-
blacklisting statutes of several states, 14 and with the traditional common-
law doctrine that contracts for personal services are non-assignable. 15 The
clubs' method of dealing with players has been compared unfavorably with
peonage,' 0 and has been attacked as "contrary to the spirit of American
institutions and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution"17 and as "an
affront to American labor.'
'1
Despite the vehemence of these criticisms, baseball's benevolent despotism
enjoys a reign unhampered either by criminal prosecutions or by revolts
among its "slaves." The last uprising of any considerable dimensions was
the formation in 1912 of the Federal League, which ultimately succumbed
to the power and wealth of the organized ownersY° At the present time,
it would be virtually impossible for any group successfully to present profes-
sional baseball games in competition with the dominant interests.20 Most
major league players seem satisfied with the prevailing state of affairs,2 ' and
the public has grown accustomed to it. Minor league players are hardly in a
position to object. The prospect of promotion to more lucrative jobs in the
major leagues militates against discontent in the minors. Individually,
Cf. Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis. 467, 246 N. W\. 567 (1933), (1933)
18 IOWA L. Rnv. 546.
12. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward,
Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, all supra note 3.
13. Brooklyn Baseball Club v. _McGuire, Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson,
American Base Ball & Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, Metropolitan Exhibition Co.
v. Ward, Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, Harrisburg Base-Ball Club. v. Ath-
letic Ass'n, all supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., IL.. Rzv. STAT. (1935) c. 38, § 116; Mo. STAT. AN;. (Vernon, 1932)
§ 4255; N. Y. PENAL LAw § 580.
15. Davis v. Coburn, 8 Mass. 299 (1811); 2 Wn.LisTox, Cot"Ancs (2d ed. 1935)
§421.
16. See American Base Ball & Athletic E.xhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 CENT. L J.
449, 451 (C. C. St. Louis 1902) (citing U. S. Co.sT. Am't XIII, § 1, prohibiting
slavery and involuntary servitude); American League Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86
Misc. 441, 461, 465, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6, 17, 19 (Sup. Ct. 1914) ; N. Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1928, p. 26, cal. 5.
17. American League Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, at 465, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 6, at 19 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
18. Rep. Ray Cannon (D., Wis.) in N. Y. Times, May 5, 1937, p. 11, col. 1.
19. The organized owners have fought off or bought off several rebellions. The
Union Association, formed in 1884, disbanded after one year. The Players' League,
created in 1890, also lasted only one year. SPi\K, THE NAT:ioAL GAn (1910) 14.
20. See Kieran, Big League Business, SAT. Ev. PosT. May 31, 1930, p. 16.
21. Communications from various sports writers. There seems to be some dif-
ference of opinion, however. N. Y. Times, April 17, 1937, p. 12, col. 6.
22. In no other industry do the capitalists make such sustained and scientific efforts
to discover and develop competent laborers. The major league clubs spend a million
dollars annually on their "scouting" system. Evans, Hunting Baseball Ivory, SAT. Evr.
PosT, April 27, 1935, p. 16.
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the players have no power to fight the system - and they are essentially
individualists, lacking all semblance of organization or class consciousness.2 3
Attempts to unionize them have repeatedly failed. The first Brotherhood,
organized in 1887, lasted only four years, disbanding after the Players'
.League's losing struggle with the National League.24 A second Brother-
hood, formed in 1900, broke up two years later.2 5 In 1912 the Baseball
Players' Fraternity was organized. Although successful in obtaining from
the National Commission several concessions favorable to the players, it
went out of existence in 191726 as the result of an ill-fated strike. Since
then only two abortive efforts have been made to unite the baseball
"workers."
So long as baseball's much maligned combination operates to the satis-
faction of owners, players and public, its present form of self-government
will probably be allowed to continue notwithstanding apparent infractions
of the law. Although open bidding annually for the players' services would
avoid some of the tyrannical aspects of the present system, it might result
in concentrating the best players among the wealthiest clubs. The prevail-
ing order makes for closer pennant races, better ball games, greater public
interest and greater consumer satisfaction.2  And more fun for the fans
means more money for the magnates.
23. The Association of Professional Ball Players of America (membership 2,381)
is not a union; it is a benevolent organization with the objective of caring for sick
and indigent players.
24. SPALDING'S OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE (1937) pp. 342-343.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. The despots of the diamond have performed a remarkable job in reducing the
gambling and other scandal which formerly demoralized the sport and threatened its
existence in 1875. To those suspected of dishonesty, baseball's self-government has been
harsher than the law. Several men acquitted by juries of various offenses have never-
theless been expelled from the game.
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